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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
country.4 This is logically so since this is a new country and the
records of our governmental acts have been comparatively well kept.
Prescriptive right is based on the theory of a lost grant 5 which is
almost as difficult to support logically in this, a new country, as a
lost governmental act. Where a group of people is concerned, a
more logical basis to establish the right would be dedication. In order
to constitute a dedication there must be clear intent,6 but there need
not be a grantee in existence capable of taking the grant.1 It is sub-
mitted that intent could be inferred from long user as easily as a
lost grant or governmental act. It follows therefore, if the plaintiffs
here had been organized as a village (capable of taking the grant),
or if the claim had been based on dedication, there would have been
grounds to overrule the motion to dismiss the complaint but with
custom alleged as the sole basis of the right it is hard to find fault
with the decision.
G. F. J.
REAL PROPERTY-ESTATES ON CONDITION-EVIDENCE.-The
plaintiff's grandfather deeded property to the defendant on the
express condition that a church be built thereon and devoted in
perpetuity to divine worship. Right of re-entry was reserved in case
of breach. After complying for a number of years with the grantor's
wishes, the defendant leased the premises. While the lessee was in
possession the interior of the church was remodeled. A dance floor
was laid. A part of the new furnishings consisted of a pool table, a
card table and a bowling alley. Beer and liquor were dispensed
therein and on several occasions the premises were subleased for
political rallies, boxing bouts and smokers. In an action in ejectment
brought by the heirs of the grantor, held, plaintiff entitled to premises,
as this was a conveyance on condition subsequent, and the court will
take judicial notice that the use to which the premises were put was
violative of the express condition in the deed. Wagstaff v. Ingersoll
et al., 156 Misc. 24, 279 N. Y. Supp. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Whenever possible the law favors the settling of title and in the
absence of a right to re-enter reserved in the deed, the courts will
'Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425 (N. Y. 1838); Graham v. Walker, 78
Conn. 130, 61 Atl. 98 (1905); Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N. J. ..L. 125 (1825);
Albright v. Cortright, 64 N. J. L. 330, 45 At]. 634 (1900).
'Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N. Y. Supp. 731, aff'd, 235 N. Y.
554, 139 N. E. 732 (1921).
0Holdane v. Trustees of Village of Cold Spring, 21 N. Y. 474 (1860);
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. River R. R. v. Village of Ossining, 207 N. Y. 648,
100 N. E. 1131 (1910); In re West 172d St., New York City, 171 App. Div.
242, 157 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1st Dept. 1916).
City of Cincinnati v. White, 31 U. S. 431 (1832) ; Buffalo, L. & R. Ry.
v. Hoyer, 214 N. Y. 236, 108 N. E. 455 (1915).
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construe the express conditions as covenants whose breach does not
work a forfeiture." In these situations where the right of re-entry is
reserved the breach must be substantial and not merely technical. 2
The breach of itself is not sufficient to divest title; there must be a
re-entry on the part of the grantor and his heirs.3 This right of
re-entry is merely a possibility and can neither be assigned, conveyed,
devised or mortgaged but accrues to the heirs as representatives of
the original grantor.4 If the person entitled to re-enter commences
an action in ejectment, forfeiture is accomplished and a conveyance is
necessary to restore title to the grantees.5 On the other hand, the
person having the right to re-enter may waive the breach and be
estopped from asserting any claim to the premises for that particular
breach.0 The statutes on expectant estates do not apply to possibili-
ties, 7 and as these possibilities were not alienable or devisable on
common law, their status remains the same.
8
M. E. M cC.
TAXATION-TAXING TO PROvIDE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE-
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.-In 1933 the government, as part of its eco-
nomic emergency program, enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act.'
The essential features of the "A. A. A." made provision for stabiliza-
tion of prices on agricultural products through the medium of benefit
payments to farmers for curtailment of production. Appropriation
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Avery v. N. Y. C.
etc. Ry., 106 N. Y. 142, 12 N. E. 619 (1887); Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361,
22 N. E. 145 (1889) ; Graves v. Deterling, 120 N. Y. 447, 24 N. E. 655 (1890);
Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N. Y. 29, 40 N. E. 635 (1895).
'Riggs v. Purcell. 66 N. Y. 193 (1876); Woodsworth v. Payne, 74 N. Y.
176 (1878) ; Rose v. Hawley, 141 N. Y. 366, 36 N. E. 335 (1894).
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Plumb v. Tubbs,
41 N. Y. 442 (1869) ; Moore v. Pitts, 53 N. Y. 85 (1873) ; Conger v. Duryee.
90 N. Y. 594 (1881); Uppington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359
(1896); Trustees, etc. v. City of N. Y.. 173 N. Y. 38. 65 N. E. 853 (1903).
'Nichol v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 12 N. Y. 121 (1854); Uppington v. Corri-
gan, 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359 (1896).
'Ludlow v. N. Y. & Har. Ry., 12 Barb. 440 (N. Y. 1852); Conger v.
Duryee. 90 N. Y. 594 (1881).
6 Hunter v. Osterhandt, 11 Barb. 33 (N. Y. 1851) ; Ludlow v. N. Y. & Har.
Ry., 12 Barb. 440 (N. Y. 1852): Ireland v. Nichols, 46 N. Y. 413 (1871);
Conzer v. Duryee, 90 N. Y. 594 (1881) ; Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12, 39
N. E. 409 (1895).
'N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1909) § 35: Vail v. Lonz Island R. R., 106 N. Y.
2S3. 12 N. E. 607 (1887); Griffen v. Shepard, 124 N. Y. 70, 26 N. E. 339
(1891).
'Towle v. Remson. 70 N. Y. 312 (1877); Uppington v. Corrigan, 151
N. Y. 143. 45 N. E. 359 (1896).
148 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. 601 et seq. (1933).
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